British spies were charged with gifting Chinese agents yesterday and endangering national security by boasting about their secret work on LinkedIn.
A Daily Mail investigation revealed that more than 1,000 people exposed themselves as potential targets by declaring their status in violation of government regulations, including military counterintelligence officers and GCHQ analysts.
Workers who pass background checks on their money, families, and sexual orientation can access material that is classified as Top Secret.
The categorization applies to information that could jeopardize national security, result in significant casualties, and wreck the economy.
It comes as MI5 Director General Ken McCallum issued a ‘breathtaking’ warning last week about the threat posed by China, whose influence in Britain has resulted in a seven-fold increase in spy investigations.
He also warned about the dangers of websites like LinkedIn, which are used to target academics, corporations, and government officials.
One thousand four hundred twenty two UK employees shared their developed vetting status on LinkedIn, according to a Mail audit, giving enemy operators a ready supply of simple targets. These comprised:
a former RAF communications expert who gave GCHQ, MI6, and NATO top-secret briefings;
a top manager of the Navy’s T-26 Global Warship Program, which is constructing a frigate intended to pursue Russian nuclear submarines;
an F-35B fighter jet test pilot, the country’s main strike vehicle for the ensuing three decades;
a rocket scientist who openly bragged about having ratified the Official Secrets Act.
The pages were found by The Mail through searches of publicly accessible LinkedIn pages. Security services are particularly concerned about Chinese involvement, despite worries about Russian espionage.
Mr. McCallum asserted that MI5 has increased its capability by twofold to counter Beijing’s spies and issued a dire warning that more expansion is required to prevent China from taking the “crown jewels” from UK companies and institutions.
He said MI5 was looking into 100 “intelligence leads” from an app that was introduced in May to stop foreign spies from exploiting online sites to lure businesspeople, academics, and government officials.
Before accepting unfamiliar contacts online, the Think Before You Link software enables potential targets to conduct their own “digital due diligence” assessments.
An intelligence expert at the University of Buckingham, Professor Anthony Glees, called LinkedIn “one of the single gravest threats to national security right now” and described the disclosures as “terrible.”
If I were a member of the Russian military intelligence, he said, I would do everything in my power to find out more about the anti-air missile and drone programs in Britain. A logical initial step would be to use LinkedIn to find individuals who are well-versed in those programs.
“These folks are freely and recklessly giving our enemies access to their knowledge.”
The 16 Air Assault Brigade, an elite unit thought to be on alert in case troops are dispatched to support the Ukrainian war effort, had one profile that belonged to a senior officer assigned to it.
In the UK or Germany, he added, he was looking for a new position that would capitalize on his strengths in research, analysis, communication, and leadership.
The delivery of the next generation of electronic surveillance platforms for the British Army was the responsibility of another telecoms specialist.
Others included a network engineer who assisted in implementing cybersecurity measures for the Ministry of Defense and a naval officer in charge of a £300 million signals intelligence program.
The Mail also used LinkedIn to locate 14 members of the MoD team who were constantly updating the Ukrainian army on the Russian invasion. They consisted of an expert in drone surveillance, a cybersecurity expert, and an AI programmer.
A former military intelligence colonel named Philip Ingram called these links to online CVs with postal and mobile addresses a “open target for spies” because they were present on several accounts.
Advertising your access to state secrets, he declared, is stupid. On LinkedIn, I once encountered a Chinese spy who tried to use me as an asset by pretending to be a businessman who required a paper on security and counterterrorism. The idea was to get to know one other and then ask for more private information.
“I had the privilege of working in counter-intelligence for years, so I was able to recognize what was happening.” Not many individuals can afford that.
“You wouldn’t provide your home location, phone number, and security clearance status to a stranger in a store, so why would you do it online?”
“We do not comment on individuals’ security clearance,” a government spokesman stated.